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JULY-AucuST, 1962
COPYRIGHTS: ABANDONMENT BY PUBLICATION
By AULT M. NATHANIELSZ*
This paper was awarded the First Prize of $250 in the 1962
Nathan Burkan Memorial Competition at the University of Denver
College of Law and has been submitted to the national copyright
writing competition. It is published through the courtesy of the
American Society of Composers, Authors and Publishers.
The doctrine that an author has a right of property in
his ideas and is entitled to demand for them the same per-
petual protection which the law accords to the proprietor
of personal property generally, finds no recognition either
in the common law or in the statutes of any civilized coun-
try. When he has embodied his thoughts in manuscript, the
latter is his exclusive property having the characteristics of
transfer and succession common to personal property. Being
his property, the author may exercise full dominion over it.
He may publish it to the world or not, at his option.1
There are no property rights in an idea.2 It is the physical
manifestation of ideas which is property, not the ideas themselves.
There are, as a matter of fact, two separate and distinct types of
property rights in such property.3 The manuscript is tangible prop-
erty which is capable of being owned and sold just as any personalty
and as the paper itself before any written word was placed on it.
The second right is an intangible right, separate and apart from
the paper, the manifestation of thought. This second right is the
exclusive right to reproduce or copy the manifestation.
The Supreme Court explained the distinction between the in-
tangible right to copy and the rights of ownership of the tangible
object produced in Bobbs-Merrill Co. v. Straus.4 The Court held that
the copyright is an exclusive right to multiply copies for the benefit
of the creator or his assigns disconnected from, although dependent
on, physical existence. It is an incorporeal right to print and publish.
It is not a right to perpetually own the copies made with authority
of the author or his assignee. Once this tangible property is sold the
originator has no control over the item, although he remains the
sole owner of the intangible right to copy.5
These two distinct rights are originally in one person, the au-
thor, but the rights later may and usually do exist in different per-
sons at the same time, i.e., the author and the owner of a copy.
Indeed if this were not true then the person who owned a writing,
either the original manuscript or a copy, by virtue of having title
* June graduate, University of Denver College of Law.
1 Carter v. Bailey, 64 Me. 458, 461, 18 Am. Rep. 273, 274 (1874).
2 Dunham v. General Mills, 116 F.Supp. 152 (D. Mass. 1953); Carter v. Bailey, supra note 1;
Palmer v. De Witt, 47 N.Y. 532, 7 Am.Rep. 480 (1872).
3 Bobbs.Merrill Co. v. Straus, 210 U.S. 339 (1908); Stephens v. Cody, 14 How. (55 U.S.) 528
(1852); Werckmeister v. American Lithographic Co., 134 Fed. 321 (2d Cir. 1904).
4 Supro note 3.
5 Id. at 347. The Court quoted Stephens v. Cady, 14 How. (55 U.S.) 528, 530 (1852); "The
copyright is an exclusive right to the multiplication of the copies, for the benefit of the author or
his assigns, disconnected from the plate, or any other physical existence. It is an incorporeal right
to print and publish ...... The sole right to vend is not to be construed as to give the author
after he has sold a copy the right to control the price of resale. The author has lost his property
right in the physical item sold. It is the right to make copies which is protected. The book itself
is the property of the buyer.
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to the tangible personalty could copy it. The raison d'etre of copy-
right law is to allow the author to dispose of the tangible property
but to retain the intangible right to copy exclusively and thus en-
courage the arts by allowing the author to profit by selling copies
of his work.
It is the intangible right to prevent others from copying with
which the law of copyrights, either common law or statutory, con-
cerns itself, and it is this right that will be involved whenever the
terms literary property rights or intellectual property rights are
used. Once the thought is made manifest, the particular manifesta-
tion is, under common law doctrine, the sole and complete property
of the artist.6 This is what is sometimes called a common law copy-
right; it is akin to and based upon personal property rights. In
Wheaton v. Peters,7 the Supreme Court said: "That an author, at
common law, has a property in his manuscript, and may obtain
redress against anyone who deprives him of it, or by improperly
obtaining a copy endeavors to realize a profit by its publication,
cannot be doubted." s This was restated with approval by the Su-
preme Court in Bobbs-Merrill Co. v. Straus.9
Indeed the right of an author to control the reproduction and
publication of any work, at least until such time as he first publishes
it or authorizes its publication, has never been seriously doubted.
This common law protection of the right to copy comes into exist-
ence when a manifestation of an idea is created and remains per-
petually in existence until publication is made. 10 This common law
right is now recognized by statute." The question has more force-
fully arisen as to an author's rights in literary property after pub-
lication.
Most authors write for the express purpose of having their
work published, although it is true there have been some authors
who did not have this goal in mind but penned their work for
amusement, or for close friends. If an author's right to control or
6 Little v. Hall, 18 How. (59 U.S.) 165 (1856); Grant v. Kellogg, 154 F.2d 59 (2d Cir. 1946);
58 F.Supp. 48 (S.D.N.Y. 1944).
7 8 Pet. (33 U.S.) 591 (1834).
8 Id. at 657.
9 210 U.S. 339, 346 (1908).
10 Werckmeister v. American Lithographic Co., 134 Fed. 321 (2d Cir. 1904). The decision in
this case was cited with approval and made the basis for the decision of the Supreme Court in
American Tobacco Co. v. Werckmeister, 207 U.S. 284 (1907).
11 17 U.S.C. §2 (1947) which reads: "Nothing in this title shall be construed to annul or limit
the right of the author or proprietor of an unpublished work, at common law or in equity, to
prevent the copying, publication, or use of such unpublished work without his consent, and to
obtain damages therefor."
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prevent copying terminates upon first publication the author has
lost a valuable asset, i.e., his literary property rights. The framers
of the Constitution realized this. Thus, the Constitution expressly
provides that the Congress shall be empowered: "To promote the
Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times
to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective
Writings and Discoveries.'
2
Congress exercised this power in 1790 by enacting a copyright
law.3 The Supreme Court first interpreted this statute in 1834 in
the case of Wheaton v. Peters14 and discussed the author's literary
property rights at length. The Court held that the copyright clause
of the Constitution did not merely permit Congress to enact laws
which would be declaratory of existing rights, but permitted Con-
gress to enact laws which would create new legal rights, pursuant
to the object of the copyright clause. Copyright after publication
originates under the act of Congress, and therefore, each require-
ment of the statute must be complied with to perfect the copyright.
The Wheaton v. Peters" case is somewhat confusing since it
held that the right to copyright protection after publication is purely
statutory, springing directly from the Constitution. The reason for
this holding, the Court seemed to say, is that there is no federal
common law. (This reasoning was not adopted as a rule of law until
the famous case of Erie v. Tompkins 6 in 1938.) Yet the Court also
said by way of dictum in the Wheaton case that prepublication
rights of authors exists at common law and that these rights would
be recognized. The inconsistencies in dictum and the reasoning of
the Court in this case were pointed to in a later Supreme Court
decision, Holmes v. Hurst.7 In this case the Court traced the devel-
opment of copyright law:
The right of an author, irrespective of statute, to his
own productions and to a control of their publication,
seems to have been recognized by the common law, but to
have been so ill-defined that from an early period legisla-
tion was adopted to regulate and limit such right. The earli-
est recognition of this common law right is to be found in
the charter of the Stationers' Company, and certain decrees
of the Star Chamber promulgated in 1556, 1585, 1623, and
1637, providing for licensing -and regulating the manner of
printing, and the number of presses throughout the King-
dom, and prohibiting the publication of unlicensed books.
Indeed, the Star Chamber seems to have exercised the pow-
er of search, confiscation, and imprisonment without inter-
ruption from Parliament, up to its abolition in 1641. From
this time the law seems to have been in an unsettled state-
although Parliament made some efforts to restrain the li-
centiousness of the press-until the eighth year of Queen
Anne, when the first copyright act was passed, giving au-
thors a monopoly in the publication of their works for a
period of from fourteen to twenty-eight years. Notwith-
12 U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
13 Howell, The Copyright Law 4-6 (3d ed. 1952).
14 Supro note 7.
15 Ibid.
16 Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
17 174 U.S. 82 (1899).
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standing this act, however, the chancery court continued to
hold that, by the common law and independently of legisla-
tion, there was a property of unlimited duration in printed
books. This principle was affirmed as late as 1769 by the
court of King's bench in the very carefully considered case
of Millar v. Taylor, 4 Burr. 2303, in which the right of the
author of "Thomson's Seasons" to a monopoly of this work
was asserted and sustained. But a few years thereafter the
House of Lords, upon an equal division of the judges, de-
clared that the common law right had been taken away
by the statute of Anne, and that authors were limited in
their monopoly by that act. Donaldson v. Becket, 4 Burr.
2408. This remains the law of England to the present day.
An act similar in its provisions to the statute of Anne was
enacted by Congress in 1790, and the construction put upon
the latter in Donaldson v. Becket was followed by this court
in Wheaton v. Peters, 8 Pet. 591. While the propriety of
these decisions has been the subject of a good deal of con-
troversy among legal writers, it seems now to be considered
the settled law of this country and England that the right
of an author to a monopoly of his publications is measured
and determined by the copyright act-in other words, that
while a right did exist by common law, it has been super-
seded by statute."i
It is equally well settled that neither the Constitution nor the sta-
tute affects the author's common law rights prior to publication, but
the Supreme Court in Bobbs-Merrill Co. v. Straus19 quoted with
approval Drone on Copyright, page 100: "[W] hen a work is pub-
lished in print, the owner's common-law rights are lost; and, unless
the publication be in accordance with the requirements of the sta-
tute, the statutory right is not secured.
' 20
It is evident that the concept of "publication" is a critical one
in copyright law, because at the time of publication common law
rights cease and a dedication to the public is made unless the sta-
tutory requirements are met and statutory rights arise, in which
case common law rights are relinquished at the time statutory
rights are claimed. It has been said:
The word "publication" has no definite and fixed mean-
ing. "The word is legally very old, and of no one certain
meaning.*** The thought, however, running through all the
uses of the word is an advising of the public, a making
known of something to them for a purpose." Associated
Press v. International News Service, 2 Cir., 245 F. 244, 250,
2 A.L.R. 317.21
And this is true even though the present statute defines "date of
publication":
In the interpretation and construction of this title "the
date of publication" shall in the case of a work of which
copies are reproduced for sale or distribution be held to be
18 Id. at 84-85.
19 Bobbs-Merrill Co. v. Straus, 210 U.S. 339 (1908).
20 Id. at 347.
21 Marx v. United States, 96 F.2d 204, 206 (9th Cir. 1938). The court went on to say that the
29 years of copyright protection in cases of copyrighted material not intended for reproduction for
sale starts running at the date of deposit. This holding is now codified as 17 U.S.C. § 12 (1947).
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the earliest date when copies of the first authorized edition
were placed on sale, sold, or publicly distributed by the pro-
prietor of the copyright or under his authority .... 22
It must be noted that although the statute defines "date of pub-
lication" it does not define date of publication of those copyrighted
items not to be reproduced for sale. Judge Augustus Hand stated
in interpreting this section (which was then section 62 of the Copy-
right Law) in Cardinal Film Corp. v. Beck 23 that it "was an enact-
ment to fix the date from which the copyright term should begin
to run, and not a general definition of what constituted publica-
tion.
24
It is plain that what constitutes an act of publication is not
clearly legislatively defined, but the legislature has merely made a
declaration as to when the statutory period of protection begins in
respect to those copyrighted works intended to be reproduced for
sale. In all other cases the word "publication" is defined by judicial
interpretation.
The publication of a literary work without compliance with
the statutory requirements necessary to acquire a copyright is a
dedication to the public of the particular work and this results in
the loss of all exclusive rights to copy. The work enters the public
domain and may be freely copied or reproduced. This is true since
statutory copyright protection does not grant the author any rights
to reproduce but is a limitation on the rights of others to coliy. The
22 17 U.S.C. 1 26 (1947). (Emphasis supplied.)
23 248 Fed. 368 (S.D.N.Y. 1918).
24 Ibid.
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author has the legal right by statute to restrain others from copy-
ing.
2 5
The procedure by which one obtains a copyright is not com-
plicated, but many authors fail to take the required steps to protect
their literary productions until it is too late and the literary prop-
erty is deemed to be abandoned.
2 6
The general rule seems to be that a publication sufficient to
terminate common law rights is a general publication and not a
restricted dissemination of the work. The Supreme Court has held
in American Tobacco Co. v. Werckmeister7 that "to constitute pub-
lication there must be such a dissemination of the work of art itself
among the public, as to justify the belief that it took place with
the intention of rendering such work common property. '2 In this
case it was held that there was no such general publication of a
painting when it was exhibited, without notice of copyright in an
art gallery where the public was admitted for a fee and members
free and where by the laws of the gallery no one was allowed to
copy or take notes of paintings exhibited. Since there was no gen-
eral publication the artist's common law literary property protec-
tion was not abandoned.
It is important to note in the above definition that the intent
of the author to abandon is immaterial. This concept was reiterated
by the Supreme Court in Holmes v. Hurst29 when the Court held
that if an author allows his intellectual production to be published
without complying with the statute, his right exclusively to copy
is lost irrespective of his intent not to abandon.
The interesting and often cited case of F. W. Dodge Co. v. Con-
struction Information Co. 30 gives an insight into where the courts
may draw the line between a general publication which will ter-
minate the common law rights to copyright and a private disclosure
which will keep these rights intact. The F. W. Dodge Company was
engaged in the business of compiling and distributing to customers
information concerning contemplated construction projects. The in-
formation was distributed to customers under contracts in which
the customers agreed to keep the information confidential. The
defendants procured this information, copied it and sold copies to
their customers. The Court decided that the plaintiffs had a prop-
erty right in the compilations of data which, whether subject to
copyright or not, would be protected and that the dissemination of
information in this manner was not a general publication which
would end the common law copyrights.
Earlier the case of Jewelers' Mercantile Agency v. Jewelers'
Weekly Pub. Co.3 1 presented a similar factual situation. In this case
the compiler of information rented books containing business in-
formation to any who wished to rent. The leasing contract provided
that the information was to be confidential. The court said that this
amounted to a general publication. The mere fact that the book
was leased rather than sold outright to those nMembers of the public
25 State v. State Journal Co., 75 Neb. 275, 106 N.W. 434 (1905).
26 The learned author, Dr. Oliver Wendel Holmes, made this mistake when he first published his
now famous work, "An Autocrat at the Breakfast Table." Holmes v. Hurst, 174 U.S. 82 (1899).
27 207 U.S. 284 (1907).
28 Id. at 299.
29 174 U.S. 82 (1899).
30 183 Mass. 62, 66 N.E. 204 (1903).
31 155 N.Y. 241, 49 N.E. 872 (1898).
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who wished to lease such work did not change the character of the
publication from a general one to a limited dissemination.
[0] ur examination leads us to the conclusion that the pre-
sent state of the law is that, if a book be put within reach of
the general public, so that all may have access to it, no mat-
ter what limitations be put upon the use of it by the individ-
ual subscriber or lessee, it is published, and what is known
as the common-law copyright, or right of first publication,
is gone.
3 2
This case is weakened as precedent by the fact that the plaintiff
had deposited two copies at the Library of Congress. The court in
the majority opinion takes pain to point out that this alone would
be a publication, while three judges concurred, specially limiting
the grounds for reversal to the fact that the depositing of two copies
of the publication in the Library of Congress was publication.
It can be seen that there is an important distinction to be drawn
between a general publication and a limited distribution. If a gen-
eral publication has been made, common law rights to copy are lost;
if such a publication has not been made, the common law rights
are not lost. Whether the court will determine that such a publica-
tion has been made in a particular case is difficult to predict with
certainty since each case will turn on its own facts.
Into the apparently well settled law came the troublesome case
of International News Service v. Associated Press.3 3 The plaintiff
was a news wire service; the defendant was a competitor in the
same business. The defendant pirated the plaintiff's stories and
issued them as its own to its own customers. The pirated news
stories were obtained from four sources: (1) employees of plaintiff
who were bribed, (2) members of the plaintiff's news wire asso-
ciation who were induced to divulge the stories, (3) the defendant
who copied news stories from bulletin boards where they were
posted, and (4) the defendant who copied stories from early morning
editions on the east coast and telegraphed these stories to the west
coast for publication there. Neither the newspapers from which the
stories were pirated nor the stories themselves were copyrighted.
The plaintiff realizing he could assert no statutory copyright,
brought an equitable action to restrain the defendant's acts on the
basis of unfair competition.
The circuit court of appeals said that there were valuable prop-
erty rights in the news gathered but no literary property rights
as such. The east coast newspapers which were members of the
Associated Press system printed their stories with its permission.
The court held, however, that these member newspapers had no
right to abandon by publication the Associated Press' property
right in the news. Quoting from Werckmeister v. American Litho-
graphic Co., the court said: "The nature of the property in question
[a painting] in large measure determines the extent of public
right."'34 The court went on to say: "And it was held that unless
there was an 'abandonment of copyright or dedication to the public,'
the owner of a thing capable of copyright could 'expressly or by
implication confine the enjoyment of such subject to some occasion
32 Id. at 876.
33 248 U.S. 215 (1918), affirming 245 Fed. 244 (2d Cir. 1917).
34 245 Fed. 244, 251 (2d Cir. 1917).
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or definite purpose.'-35 This is undoubtedly correct, but the intent
of the author, as has been pointed out, is immaterial. The question
is whether there has been a general publication so that the public
would be justified in believing there has been such a dedication.
The court went on to hold that the piracy by the defendant was a
tort in the nature of unfair competition and injunction was ordered.
On certiorari, the Supreme Court,36 after a short discussion of
literary property and the effect of the copyright statute, decided
the case solely on the grounds of unfair competition, stating:
[W]hen the rights or privileges of the one are liable to
conflict with those of the other each party is under a duty
35 Ibid.
36 248 U.S. 215 ki918).
reach for the ALLdirector
...a new telephone product for business
The Call Director is designed for the businessman who needs
more than six pushbuttons on his phone or the secretary who
answers for a number of people. With the Call Director, you can
hold calls, intercommunicate, and set up interoffice conference
calls. For complete information on this time-saving new product,
call the Telephone Business Office and ask for a Communications
Consultant. MOUNTAIN STATES TELEPHONE 0
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so to conduct its own business as not unnecessarily or un-
fairly to injure that of the other. [Citations omitted.]
Obviously, the question of what is unfair competition
in business must be determined with particular reference
to the character and circumstances of the business. The
question here is not so much the rights of either party as
against the public, but their rights as between themselves.
See Morison v. Moat, 9 Hare, 241, 258, 68 Eng. Reprint, 492.
And although we may and do assume that neither party
has any remaining property interest as against the public
in uncopyrighted news matter after the moment of its first
publication, it by no means follows that there is no remain-
ing property interest in it as between themselves. For, to
both of them alike, news matter, however little susceptible
of ownership or dominion in the absolute sense, is stock in
trade, to be gathered at the cost of enterprise, organization,
skill, labor, and money, and to be distributed and sold to
those who will pay money for it, as for any other merchan-
dise. Regarding the news, therefore, as but the material out
of which both parties are seeking to make profits at the
same time and in the same field, we hardly can fail to re-
cognize that for this purpose, and as between them, it must
be regarded as quasi property, irrespective of the rights of
either as against the public.
In order to sustain the jurisdiction of equity over the
controversy, we need not affirm any general and absolute
property in the news as such. The rule that a court of
equity concerns itself only in the protection of property
rights treats any civil right of a pecuniary nature as a prop-
erty right [Citations omitted.]; and the right to acquire
property by honest labor or the conduct of a lawful busi-
ness is as much entitled to protection as the right to guard
property already acquired. [Citations omitted.] It is this
right that furnishes the basis of the jurisdiction in the
ordinary case of unfair competition.
37
Using this reasoning as the basis for its opinion, the Supreme
Court affirmed the circuit court of appeals holding to enjoin the
piracy and to afford reasonable protection of the complainant's
newspapers from such piracy.
Mr. Justice Brandeis in his dissent recognized the "injustice"
that would be involved in allowing the piracy, but stated that the
Court was "making new law." He succinctly points out that the
publication by the east coast papers is a general publication and
thus destroys common law copyrights in spite of the intent of the
plaintiff. It is difficult to comprehend the distinction between the
type of piracy involved in this case and that involved in a case
where an author neglects or omits to copyright his book prior to a
general publication and another prints that book thus depriving
the author of his rewards. The piracy here was enjoined as unfair
competition, but Hurst was not prevented from pirating Dr. Holmes'
book "Autocrat at the Breakfast Table" a few years earlier,3 8 be-
37 Id. at 235-37.
38 Supra note 26.
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cause it had been printed serially in a magazine and no copyright
had been obtained. There seems to be no valid distinction. Nor does
it justify the distinction to say that because International News
Service is a competitor of the Associated Press it is therefore not
a member of the general public.
Whether the distinction is valid or not, the publishers of news-
papers, even though they do not copyright their paper, seem to
have a special dispensation and are protected from having news
stories pirated for a reasonable length of time by others whose
piratical activities would impair the worth of the news item to
those who originally obtained the information and wrote the story.
This special right seems to be a slender reed on which to sup-
port a case, even though the federal courts have adhered to this
expansion of the definition of unfair competition from misrepre-
sentation to include misappropriation, 9 and one court has said:
The right to equitable relief is not confined to cases in
which one man is selling his goods as those of another. In-
ternational News Service v. Associated Press, 248 U.S. 215,
241, 39 Sup. Ct. 68, 63 L.Ed. 211, 2 A.L.R. 293. What in that
case, upon a different state of facts, was said of the re-
spondent, is applicable to defendant's conduct here, for it,
too, "amounts to an unauthorized interference with the
normal operation of complainant's legitimate business pre-
cisely at the point when the profit is to be reaped, in order
to divert a material portion of the profit from those who
have earned it to those who have not."
40
The Supreme Court reaffirmed this expansion by alluding to
the, Associated Press case in Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United
States,4 1 commonly known as the Sick Chicken case. In deciding
that the N.R.A. was unconstitutional, the Court had to determine
the meaning of "fair competition" as used in the act and thus en-
tered into a discussion of unfair competition as known to the com-
mon law. The Court said:
"Unfair competition" as known to the common law is a
limited concept. Primarily, and strictly, it relates to the
palming off of one's goods as those of a rival trader. [Cita-
tions omitted.] In recent years, its scope has been extended.
It has been held to apply to misappropriation as well as
misrepresentation, to selling of another's goods as one's own
-to misappropriation of what equitably belongs to a com-
petitor. International News Service v. Associated Press, 248
U.S. 215, 241, 242.42
In spite of the importance of the holding of the Associated Press
case it has seldom been cited by the Supreme Court.43 The Court
has not reaffirmed its holding in the Associated Press case, for the
purpose of protecting literary property after a general publication
on the ground that copying was unfair competition, even when it
39 Coca Cola v. Old Dominion Beverage Corp., 271 Fed. 600 (4th Cir. 1921), cert. denied, 256
U.S. 703 (1921).
40 Id. at 604.
41 295 U.S. 495 (1935).
42 Id. at 531.




could have taken the opportunity to do so.44 The lower federal courts
have been equally wary of applying this doctrine if to do so would
broaden its scope in the slightest. This can be seen in the case of
Public Ledger v. New York Times.45 In a bill in equity charging the
New York Times with unfair competition, the Public Ledger al-
leged that it had a contract with the London Times. The London
Times was to supply the Public Ledger with a copy of important
news items. This service was to be extended exclusively to the
Public Ledger. The plaintiff under his contract could publish or
sell these stories to other newspapers as he deemed advantageous.
One story was late in arriving. Due to this delay, the New York
Times was able to acquire a copy of this story as it appeared in the
London Times, and printed it before the Ledger. The New York
Times credited its source stating that the publication was with the
permission of the London Times. Judge Learned Hand held that
the bill should not be dismissed since unfair competition did exist
if the New York Times did in fact assert in writing that it had the
London Times' permission to use the copy. But Judge Hand ex-
pressly stated that the doctrine of International News Service v.
Associated Press did not apply.
46
Judge Learned Hand gave no reason for his statement that
International News Service v. Associated Press was not in point.
Indeed one would be hard pressed for logical reasons to so hold.
Perhaps the cases are distinguishable on their facts, and perhaps a
group of newspapers acting collectively should be treated differently
from a single newspaper acting under contract with another non-
competing newspaper.
The Associated Press case could have been used as precedent
to change the entire field of statutory copyright by the logical ex-
pansion of this doctrine to protect all types of literary property
after a general publication for a reasonable length of time on the
grounds of unfair competition. This was not done. As recently as
44 KVOS, Inc. v. Associated Press, 299 U.S. 269 (1936). In this case a radio station broadcast
news items read from the local paper. Some of these news articles were stories supplied by the
Associated Press. The Supreme Court ordered th- case dismissed on jurisdictional grounds stating that
the amount in controversy was not sufficient. The Court said by way of dicta that it probably did
not have jurisdiction in the Associated Press case either but in that case the question of jurisdiction
was not raised.
45 275 Fed. 562 (S.D.N.Y. 1921).
46The case was appealed to the Circuit Court of Appeals, Second Circuit, 279 Fed. 749 (2d
Cir. 1922). The decision in this court concerned only the question of the plaintiff's right to statutory
copyright. The court held that since the plaintiff was neither the creator, nor his assign, he had
no right to copyright the stories.
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1960 the test of "general publication" was used to decide that Ad-
miral Rickover had dedicated some speeches to the public. 4T This
dedication occurred when Admiral Rickover sent copies of the
speeches he had delivered to friends, persons interested in his topics,
and newspapers for their use. The court held that by so doing, the
Admiral had abandoned his common law rights and since he had
not at that time obtained statutory copyrights he could not later
apply for such rights.
The procedure that must be followed to obtain a statutory copy-
right is relatively simple and the courts have been, at least recently,
more liberal in their construction of the statute. Nevertheless, notice
of copyright in the first publication is deemed essential to the pro-
curement of a valid statutory copyright. In 1938 the Supreme Court
said in the case of Washingtonian Publishing Co. v. Pearson: 4
8
The Act of 1909 is a complete revision of the copyright
laws, different from the earlier Act both in scheme and lan-
guage. It introduced many changes and was intended de-
finitely to grant valuable, enforceable rights to authors,
publishers, etc., without burdensome requirements; "to af-
ford greater encouragement to the production of literary
works of lasting benefit to the world."
Under the old Act deposit of the work was essential to
the existence of copyright. This requirement caused serious
difficulties and unfortunate losses .... The present statute
(§9) declares-"Any person entitled thereto by this Act
may secure copyright for his work by publication thereof
with the notice of copyright required by this Act [ §18] ; ..."
And respondents rightly say "It is no longer necessary to
deposit anything to secure a copyright of a published work,
but only to publish with the notice of copyright.
'49
The Court then holds that the statutory penalty ° for failure to
deposit copies of the work with the registry of copyright as required
by section 13 of the statute,51 is the only penalty for failure to
deposit.
It must be noted that the Court takes care to point out, in the
instant case, that the notice was published as required by the sta-
tute. The liberal interpretation which the copyright statute received
in regard to the requirement of deposit of copies is not and has not
been extended to the requirement of notice which is rigorously
enforced. Notice is the only method of preventing the members of
the public from reaching the conclusion that the author has aban-
doned all of his literary property rights, and it is essential to the
establishment of valid statutory copyright protection.52 The statute
describing the method of notification must be strictly complied with
if the notice is to be effective and the copyright valid. Actually,
such compliance with the statute gives notice that the author is
relinquishing his common law literary property rights and is claim-
47 Public Affairs Associates, Inc. v. Rickover, 284 F.2d 262 (D.C. Cir. 1960), cert. granted, 365
U.S. 841 (1961).
48 306 U.S. 30 (1939).
49 Id. at 36-37.
50 17 U.S.C. j 14 (1947).
51 17 U.S.C. j 13 (1947).
52 Washingtonian Publish.ng Co. v. Pearson, 306 U.S. 30 (1939).
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ing statutory rights. If proper notice is not given when a general
publication is made it is conclusively presumed that the author has
abandoned his literary property rights.
The Supreme Court has said: "[T] he object of the [copyright]
statute is to give notice of the copyright to the public, by placing
upon each copy, in some visible shape, the name of the author, the
existence of the claim of exclusive right, and the date at which this
right was obtained. '5 3
In the case of Shelberg v. Eppingham,5 4 the court held that the
fact that copies of a previously copyrighted literary work had come
into a copier's possession which were not marked with the required
notice was not a good defense in an infringement action when the
pirate had actual notice of the copyright. Yet in the Thrift Plan
case,5 5 the defense that the copyright notice was not in the required
place, but was printed instead on the last page, was good. In this
copyright infringement action, such notice did not meet the sta-
tutory requirement and even though there was a strong probability
that the pirate knew of the copyright, actual knowledge was not
proven and the action failed.
The denial of protection to an author for his literary property
rights simply because he neglects or omits to include notice that
he wishes to have his property protected, or because he puts such
notice in the wrong place is ridiculous. To give newspapers a special
dispensation from this requirement of publishing a notice, as the
Supreme Court did in the Associated Press case,5" is equally ridi-
culous, for it draws a distinction where none should exist. Yet to
expand the scope of the Associated Press case would be to fly in
the face of precedent and statute. It is time that the copyright laws
be revised once more.
Abandonment of the valuable rights of an author in his literary
property should not be conclusively presumed by the fact that the
author has made a general publication and has failed to print a
notice of copyright. Abandonment of these rights should not be
presumed. It is more logical to assume that a man does not wish
to abandon valuable rights than that he does. There are few, if any,
other areas of law where intent to abandon is not important, even
decisive, in determining whether or not there is an abandonment.
Intent to abandon cannot logically be inferred from the fact of
publication. The opposite conclusion is the more logical, yet legally
such intent is presumed.
Abandonment should be made an affirmative defense in an
action for piracy and the person asserting such a defense should
have the burden of proving such abandonment, and intent should
be made an element of abandonment. The fact of publication in
itself should be notice that the author intends to use his intellectual
property to earn a livelihood, and the pirate who attempts to live
on the fruits of another's brain should be forced to legally justify
his actions, or be restrained from copying.
53 Burrow-Oiles Lithographic Co. v. Sarony, 111 U.S. 53, 55 (1884).
54 36 F.2d 991 (S.D.N.Y. 1929).
55 United Thrift Plan, Inc. v. National Thrift Plan, Inc., 34 F.2d 300 (E.D.N.Y. 1929).
56 Supra note 36.
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